Internal Instability and Technology: Do Text Messages and Social Media Increase Levels of Internal Conflict? by Henken, Lucas
University of Puget Sound
Sound Ideas
Writing Excellence Award Winners Student Research and Creative Works
12-2015
Internal Instability and Technology: Do Text
Messages and Social Media Increase Levels of
Internal Conflict?
Lucas Henken
University of Puget Sound
Follow this and additional works at: http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/writing_awards
This Social Sciences is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research and Creative Works at Sound Ideas. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Writing Excellence Award Winners by an authorized administrator of Sound Ideas. For more information, please contact
soundideas@pugetsound.edu.
Recommended Citation
Henken, Lucas, "Internal Instability and Technology: Do Text Messages and Social Media Increase Levels of Internal Conflict?"
(2015). Writing Excellence Award Winners. Paper 53.
http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/writing_awards/53
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal Instability and Technology: 
Do Text Messages and Social Media Increase Levels of Internal Conflict? 
Lucas Henken 
December 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Senior thesis submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for a  
Bachelor of Science degree in Economics 
at the University of Puget Sound 
 
2	  
	  
Abstract 
Political instability and internal conflict impact the lives of thousands every single day. 
Understanding when and why these conflicts occur has been the focus of governments, non-
governmental organizations, and scholars for years. Predicting internal conflict was originally 
qualitative in nature, based on the advice and predictions of regional and country experts. More 
recently, as computational technology has become more widely used and effective, the efforts at 
predicting internal conflict have become more quantitative. This paper builds off the work of 
prior scholars to explore the impact of technology on internal instability. A logit model is used to 
test the effect of particular independent variables – specifically cell phone and internet users – on 
internal instability during the Arab Spring. The results show that political factors and technology 
are significant in explaining internal instability during the Arab Spring, while economic factors 
had little statistical significance or impact on the predictive probability of the model. Access to, 
and the use of technology will only continue to grow. As it does, it is vital that governments, 
NGOs, and scholars acknowledge its growing role in driving social and political movements and 
its impact on internal instability.  
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Political Instability and Internal Conflict 
 Political instability and internal conflict have plagued nation-states throughout history. 
Whether based on ethnic or tribal ties, political or ideological divisions, coups or attempts to gain 
personal power, internal conflicts have caused destruction and despair on an unprecedented level. 
Societal ties, economic centers, and political institutions are destroyed, taking years to rebuild 
and at times, never recovering. However, if governments, NGOs, and the international 
community are better able to predict when and where potential internal conflict would occur, not 
only could these events potentially be prevented but the world would be prepared to handle the 
short and long-term impacts. Whether it is the overflow of the violence into other nation-states, 
an outflow of refugees or a major impact on the international economy, understanding when and 
where internal conflicts occur would greatly improve the ability of the world to prevent, address, 
and react to these conflicts.  
Governments, NGOs, and academics alike have tried to construct quantitative and 
qualitative estimates of the likelihood of internal conflict. Most of the early attempts at 
predicting internal conflict were qualitative in nature, based on the knowledge of country or 
regional experts. Models based on their expertise will ultimately rely on their opinions – which 
are potentially subjective – about where and when an internal conflict might occur.  Such 
subjectivity leaves much to be desired in terms of the accuracy and consistency of these 
predictions.  
As computational technology has become increasingly sophisticated, modeling internal 
conflict has become much more quantitative in nature. Using numerous data points (such as 
GDP, population, regime type, education levels, and previous episodes of conflict) governments, 
NGOs, and academics have attempted to model the likelihood, probability, and intensity of 
internal conflicts. However, these attempts have not led to consensus due to serious disagreement 
among the researchers about which models and variables are best suited to model internal 
conflict.  
The aim of this study is to further the study of internal conflict, by developing and testing 
a variant of previous modeling attempts. To do so, this paper uses a logit regression model (with 
the binary dependent variable, internal instability) to demonstrate that certain variables – GDP 
per capita, unemployment, population, internet access, cell phone use, and several political 
indicators – exert a significant impact on internal instability and conflict. The key contribution of 
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this paper is the finding – untested in the previous research –  that information technology is a 
significant predictor of internal conflict. Notably, as technology advances and people gain 
greater access to the internet, their ability to communicate about, and participate in protests, 
uprisings, and civil wars will increase.  
The organization of this paper is as follows: after background and context are provided, 
previous scholarship and models are reviewed, which serve as the basis for the model in this 
paper. Next, a model is constructed that explores the predictive probability of several economic 
and political variables, and also captures the potential impact of technology on internal conflict. 
The model is then tested using data from the Arab Spring and surrounding years to test the 
impact of these factors. This paper establishes that Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 
people), Political Stability and the Absence of Violence and Terrorism, Voice and 
Accountability, and Internet Users (per 100 people) are statistically significant and impact the 
predictive probability of modeling regime collapse.1 A discussion of these findings follows a 
general description of the results. The limitations and implications are then outlined.  
 
The Arab Spring 
The Arab Spring saw major uprisings in many nations throughout the Middle East and 
Africa (Boucekkine, et al., 2014). After years of oppression, lack of opportunity, and censorship, 
hundreds of thousands of people rose up against authoritarian rulers to demand change. These 
uprisings aimed to fundamentally restructure the political, social, and economic structures of the 
state. As Samuel Huntington noted in his seminal work Political Order in Changing Societies, 
revolutions are a “rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and 
myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government 
activity and policies” (Huntington, 1968, 264). However, not all intrastate conflicts are 
revolutions. Some are internal conflicts driven by ethnic, racial, tribal, economic, or ideological 
divides rather than a fundamental desire to dismantle and reform the institutions of power. How 
and why regime collapse and internal conflict occur has been the focus of extensive research in 
the social sciences and the study of comparative politics in particular.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  GDP	  per	  capita	  (%	  annual	  growth),	  Unemployment	  (%	  total	  labor	  force),	  Mobile	  Cellular	  Subscriptions	  (per	  100	  
people),	  Internet	  Users	  (per	  100	  people),	  Population,	  Political	  Stability	  and	  the	  Absence	  of	  Violence	  and	  Terrorism,	  
Rule	  of	  Law,	  and	  Voice	  and	  Accountability	  are	  all	  independent	  variables	  included	  in	  this	  study.	  A	  description	  of	  
these	  variables	  and	  why	  they	  are	  included	  is	  explained	  further	  on	  in	  this	  paper	  under	  the	  Model	  section.	  	  
5	  
	  
This study focuses specifically on the Arab Spring for several main reasons. First, the 
Arab Spring was the first major case of uprisings following the proliferation of technology. 
Many scholars, government advisors, and commentators discussed the potentially significant 
impact of technology on the internal instability of the Arab Spring. However, the impact of 
technology and social media on internal instability has not been quantitatively tested, as it is a 
recent phenomenon and the case studies are largely limited to the Arab Spring. Second, by 
focusing on a general region and time period (North Africa and the Middle East from 2007-
2014), this study is better able to control for some of the variation that would arise with using 
different regions and time periods: the importance of and access to technology, the type of 
regime (largely authoritarian/monarchies).  
 
 Qualitative vs. Quantitative Analysis 
Many scholars have theorized about the causes and timing of intrastate social and 
political conflicts using qualitative and expert analysis (Silverman, et al., 2008). Prior to the 
impressive technological advances since the 1990s, policy and decision makers relied heavily on 
the opinions of regional or country experts (O’Brien, 2010). A good example of this reliance on 
expert opinion is the United States State Department, which has Political Officers who analyze 
the “political climate” in the host country and “decipher events as they relate to U.S. interests, 
negotiations, and policies.”2 Leaders of many countries have a national security team made up of 
experts who provide advice and opinions as to what type and where conflict might occur. Prior to 
the more recent advances in modeling techniques, many governments and non-governmental 
organizations relied heavily on these expert opinion of officials on the ground and academics 
who were regional or country experts. However, these qualitative estimates were prone to human 
error with inconsistent and at times, wholly inaccurate predictions. More recently, governments 
and NGOs have become more reliant on the use of data and quantitative methods of prediction. 
Since the 1990s, the type and quality of modeling techniques have improved and 
expanded. Furthermore, the increase in the availability of technology has allowed researchers to 
test theoretical models with empirical tests. This is perhaps the most significant development in 
the field of crisis modeling, as it allowed governments, NGOs, and private companies to rely 
more heavily of quantitative rather than qualitative data. The implications of creating an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  http://careers.state.gov/work/foreign-­‐service/officer/career-­‐tracks#po	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objective, data-driven model of internal instability are tremendous. From preventative to 
reactionary foreign policy, foreign aid, and diplomacy, a model capable of predicting potential 
intrastate conflict and regime collapse would be of great assistance to those in government trying 
to shape foreign and domestic policy. But this model would also be of importance to business 
leaders and companies, as understanding the risks and potential occurrence of intrastate conflict 
and regime collapse would greatly impact decisions to invest or not invest in certain industries, 
markets, countries, and regions.   
Yet, despite the consensus that developing a model capable of predicting intrastate 
conflict would provide invaluable assistance to governments, nongovernmental organizations, 
businesses, and militaries, opinions on which techniques and variables should be used and the 
validity of conclusions that are drawn differ greatly. Game theoretical, agent-based, geo-spatial, 
and logit models are all used to predict intrastate conflict. But there are also those who argue that 
it is the models that are not being used that have the most potential (Schrodt, 2013, 295). 
Furthermore, those that do use the same models cannot seem to agree on which variables to use, 
and – in the case of logit models – whether statistical significance (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, and 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) or predictive probability (O’Brien, 2010, Ward et al., 2010) of the 
independent variables are better evaluators of a model’s strength. Due to discrepancies in the 
type of model and variables, and the inconsistencies in the conclusions drawn from them, 
modeling internal conflicts warrants further research.  
 
Prior Scholarship  
Some of the foundational work on modeling intrastate conflict focuses on a game theory 
approach. Using game theory modeling and a choice theoretic perspective Ginkel and Smith 
(1999), Pierskalla (2010), and Boucekkine et al. (2014) developed numerous explanations for the 
decision making process of a regime and regime opponents. In particular, game theoretical 
models focus on the cost benefit analysis and timing of regime opponents revolting and the 
response of the regime (Ginkel and Smith, 1999, Moore, 2000, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, 
Pierskalla, 2010, and Boucekkine, et al., 2012). These studies focus on the ability of a regime to 
suppress internal conflict, both in terms of the initial decision to revolt and the ability of the 
regime to put down the revolt if it begins. The studies found that the greater the ability of the 
regime to suppress dissent (either perceived by the opposition, or actual), the less likely internal 
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conflict begins and the more likely the regime is able to remain in power (Boucekkin, et al., 
2012). Other studies have found that it is dangerous for a regime to offer concession as it 
encourages further demands. Additionally, major revolts, when they occur, are more likely in 
highly repressive regimes, as there is a greater level of trust between the masses and their 
leadership; and regimes collapse suddenly (Ginkel and Smith, 1999). Lastly, some prior work 
found that high rates of inequality are a driving force behind regime change in democracies and 
non-democracies alike, indicating the importance of economic factors on internal stability or 
instability (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). However, there is limited consensus regarding the 
ability of a regime to repress, the decision making process to revolt and repress, or when and 
where interstate conflict will occur. But as Pierskalla (2010) notes, there are two main areas of 
consensus: (1) that there is a negative correlation between the strength of democratic institutions 
and the use of repression and (2) the fact that governments, when faced with challenges to their 
power, will use repression to maintain control. Beyond these two findings, game theoretical 
modeling has provided limited understanding or agreement regarding the decision making 
process to revolt, how the government will react, or what tactics will be used. Furthermore, it 
does little to model when and if an intrastate conflict will occur. Rather, game theoretical 
modeling focuses on the decision making process rather than the factors (independent variables) 
that predict intrastate conflict (dependent variable). Pierskalla notes that prior research and 
analysis “is insufficient for capturing the strategic nature of protest and repression” as it relied 
heavily on qualitative analysis and would benefit greatly by including quantitative analysis 
(2010, pg. 1).  
Recently, governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private institutions 
have moved towards a more data driven approach to predict conflict and crises. Leading the way 
for over fifty years is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Its Integrated 
Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) uses heterogeneous statistical and agent-based models to 
analyze and predict crises throughout the world and provide US military Combatant 
Commanders (COCOMs) with real-time updates on potential instability and conflict (Lockheed 
Martin Corporation 2015). What is most impressive about the ICEWS is its use of several 
different sub-model techniques to predict instability and conflict. Unlike many prior Conflict 
Early Warning Systems (CEWs) that used single form models, ICEWS approaches instability 
and conflict prediction with an integrated and comprehensive modeling system.  
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Conflict early warning systems have relied extensively on three main modeling 
techniques (O’Brien 2010, 93). First, many scholars, government contractors, and private sector 
researchers use Agent-Based Models (ABMs) that focus on variables associated with individual 
leaders and the society to evaluate potential future outcomes. Second, designers of CEWs also 
use Geo-Spatial Network Models (disaster/crisis informatics) to predict crisis and conflict using 
“structural factors, event counts, and various types of spatial networks” (O’Brien 2010, 93). 
Third, logistic - “logit” - regression models use domestic and international political, economic, 
and societal data to forecast potential hotspots and conflict zones. Lastly, some have used 
Bayesian techniques to aggregate the three prior models. Basically, the Bayesian technique 
combines predictions from all three models with probability estimates for each crisis and 
conflict. These three models are outlined in the following paragraphs.  
Agent-Based Models take on several forms and, according to O’Brien, the ICEWS uses 
both Silverman et al.’s Factionism and Lustick et al.’s Political Science-Identity (PS-I) models to 
provide further insight into the role of individuals and institutions on internal instability (2010, 
93). Silverman et al. (2008) used the analysis of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to create 
comprehensive profiles of governmental and societal leaders (both in the regime, and those 
fighting against it) as well as the followers of both to understand domestic relations and potential 
conflict (122-123). While this is a game theory model, it is a behavioral game theory that 
explores and analyses the actions of different factions and the impact of individual leaders – 
fighting for and against the regime (124-125). Silverman et al. found that the more repressive or 
extreme a regime leader is, the more likely it was that supporters of the regime leaders would 
stop supporting them. In addition to losing support, a more repressive or extreme regime leader 
would also push the opposition towards for extreme positions, including violence against the 
regime and its leader (153). Like Silverman et al.’s Factionism AGM, Lustick’s PS-I model also 
analyses “agents” of the state. However, the PS-I AGM uses agents that represent ethnic and 
political identities that are geographically located and represent not only the different groups in 
society but also the different regions within a state (Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004). 
Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson find that government can spend relatively few resources and 
dramatically decrease ethnic and regional conflicts by increasing representation as compared to 
the amount of resources necessary to suppress these conflict using force (2004, 224). Both of 
these models rely heavily on SMEs and their “expert” knowledge based upon years of study and 
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research about particular groups and regions. While these experts do know an extensive amount 
about different states and their associated political, societal, and economic structures, these 
AGMs still rely heavily on soft qualitative data and the opinions and estimates of these experts, 
not on hard quantitative data. In order to address this concern, the ICEWS also aggregated 
several other models including geo-spatial network models and logistic regression.  
Geo-spatial network models focus extensively on the interstate relationships of states. 
Using proxies for political, economic, and societal interconnection, geo-spatial network models 
aim to measure the importance of interstate relationships on stability and the potential for 
conflict (Gleditsch and Ward 2002, Hoff and Ward 2004). Geo-spatial models help to better 
understand the macro-level indicators of conflict, in particular inter-state relations and potential 
conflict zones and areas of instability. While macro-level interstate variables are important, geo-
spatial models do not capture the same level of specificity on the local level that other models – 
specifically logistic regression models – are able to.  
Logistic regression models are also used in the ICEWS to capture “macro-structural and 
event data factors” that focus on a particular country and include data points such as regime type, 
poverty level, education level, health of the society, to name a few potential intrastate indicators 
(O’Brien 2010, pg. 93). Logistic regression models model both the likelihood of an Event of 
Interest (EOIs) occurring and the statistical significance and predictive probability of individual 
independent variables.  
 The use of logistic models to predict intrastate conflict3 is a more recent phenomena 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Shellman 2008, Shellman et al. 2010, Ward 
et al. 2010, Bell et al. 2013). While independent and dependent variables vary from study to 
study, all focus on the impact of independent variables on the likelihood of a given intra-state 
conflict occurring. The independent variables in all studies focused on political, social and 
economic dimensions of a country such as: regime type and state strength, religious and ethnic 
diversity, population, education levels, and GDP per capita and dependence on natural resources 
(in particular, oil). Fearon and Laitin (2003) found that the end of the Cold War, ethnic and 
religious diversity, and the location of broad ethnic or political grievances does not explain when 
or where civil wars will break out (pg. 75). Collier and Hoeffler found that high dependence on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  While	  these	  scholars	  look	  at	  many	  different	  specific	  types	  of	  conflict	  -­‐	  ethnic,	  religious,	  state-­‐nonstate,	  nonstate-­‐
nonstate,	  etc.	  –	  all	  focus	  on	  intrastate	  conflict.	  Therefore,	  this	  paper	  uses	  the	  term	  intrastate	  conflict	  to	  describe	  
general	  internal	  conflict.	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primary commodity exports and a highly dispersed population greatly increase the likelihood of 
internal conflict (580). Furthermore, they found that male secondary education enrollment, per 
capita income, higher GDP growth rate, a highly dispersed population and the overall population 
size are all statistically significant in their logit model (588). Specifically, they found that there 
was a positive correlation between these variables and the likelihood that a conflict would break 
out. However, in recent years, there has been a shift in how independent variables are valued in 
these civil war logit models. In the past, scholars focused on the statistical significance of 
independent variables in the model (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). More 
recently the focus has been on the predictive probability of the model (O’Brien 2010, Ward et al. 
2010).  
Ward et al. (2010) explore the models of Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) with a specific focus on impact of variables on the predictive probability of the 
model rather than the statistical significance of the individual model. In doing so, Ward et al. 
find that many of the independent variables that were found to be statistically significant (ethnic 
and religious fractionalization, commodity dependence, GDP growth) in both studies have a very 
limited impact on the predictive probability of the models (2010, 368-371). Furthermore, when 
Ward et al. apply the Fearon and Laitin, and Collier and Hoeffler models to an out-of-sample 
data set, they find that certain variables (GDP and population in the Fearon and Laitin model, 
and Population, Peace, and Male Secondary School in the Collier and Hoeffler model) have a 
very significant impact on the predictive probability of the model while other factors (religious 
and ethnic fractionalization in both models) have almost no impact on the predictive probability 
of the model despite a wide variation in the statistical significance of these variables in the 
original model. The work of Ward et al. (2010) tells us two important things: (1) predictive 
probability is of greater importance than statistical significance and, (2) which variables in the 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) models have a significant impact on 
the predictive probability of intrastate conflict (GDP per capita, population, and male secondary 
education). While these three modeling techniques are widely used, there are scholars (Schrodt, 
2013) that argue against using these models and advocate for the use of yet different models.  
Schrodt makes a strong argument against using the typical models – such as those 
explained above – as other models “provide alternative structures for determining regularities in 
data” (2013, 295). Schrodt notes two examples, correspondence analysis and support vector 
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machines as being particularly robust and highly available – and yet not widely used (2013, pg. 
295).  While some of these models have potential to provide new evidence and a new way of 
thinking about modeling internal conflicts and crises, they are beyond both the knowledge, 
ability, and time of this author. Schrodt’s argument is important to keep in mind as we continue 
to investigate possible ways of modeling conflict and crises. However, this research and paper 
focus on the more common models, and uses a logistic regression model to predict the 
probability of internal conflict and crises.  
 This paper aims to further the discussion of Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004), Ward et al. (2010), and O’Brien (2010) to better understand which independent 
variables are statistically significant, and have an impact on the predictive probability of the logit 
model. Furthermore, this study specifically focuses on the impact of technology on the Arab 
Spring.  
 
Model:  
 As previously stated, a logit regression model is used to explore the possibility of internal 
instability or regime change using a data set of nineteen countries over eight years (2007-2014). 
A logit regression model is used for two main reasons (1) the dependent variable is binary – 
either internal instability occurs, or it does not, and (2) like a OLS regression, a logit regression 
model allows exploration of the impact of specific variables (outlined below) on the likelihood of 
internal instability.  
 There are 19 countries in the data set, not all of which experienced internal instability 
during the selected time period (2007-2014).4 Not all the countries faced serious challenges, but 
not all those that had major episodes of internal instability also experienced regime change. 
There were in fact only five nations that underwent partial regime collapse (Syria and Yemen) or 
complete regime change (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia). Other nations experienced some form of 
protest or attempts to remove a certain leader or regime from power. This paper aims to explore 
the importance of particular variables – notably technology – on internal instability during the 
Arab Spring. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Those	  countries	  are:	  Algeria,	  Bahrain,	  Djibouti,	  Egypt,	  Iran,	  Iraq,	  Jordan,	  Kuwait,	  Lebanon,	  Libya,	  Mauritania,	  
Morocco,	  Oman,	  Qatar,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  Syria,	  Tunisia,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  and	  Yemen.	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Model: Variables 
 This study focuses on internal instability during the Arab Spring between the years 2007-
2014.  
Dependent Variable 
 In this study, the dependent variable is whether or not there was internal instability 
between the years 2007-20145. It is measured on a binary scale with 0 equivalent to no/minor 
internal instability and 1 representative of major internal instability or regime collapse. As noted, 
the study includes the years 2007-2014 which captures the Arab Spring (2010-2011). Again, 
there were only five nations that experienced partial or total regime change: Egypt, Libya, Syria, 
Tunisia, and Yemen. Because there were only five nations that experienced regime change, this 
study also includes major internal instability to broaden our understanding of what causes 
internal instability and the ultimate manifestation of this instability – regime change. This study 
relies on the analysis of Dr. Marshall, Director of the Center for Systemic Peace. Dr. Marshall 
compiled data on internal conflict in an impressive database titled “Major Episodes of Political 
Violence 1946-2014 (2014). As Dr. Marshall notes, “’Major Episodes of Political Violence’ 
involve at least 500 ‘directly-related’ fatalities and reach a level of intensity in which political 
violence is both systematic and sustained” (Marshall, 2014). The binary dependent variable used 
in this study is based largely upon the data and analysis of Dr. Marshall and the Center for 
Systemic Peace.  
Independent Variables  
GDP per capita (PPP – USD) 
As previously outlined, prior research has shown that economic indicators that capture 
opportunities and inequality play a role in causing internal conflict. This study uses GDP per 
capita (PPP-USD) to capture some of these economic factors. It is a measurement of purchasing 
power parity in US dollars of a nations GDP per capita. (The World Bank, 2014). The PPP-USD 
of GDP per capita is used for two primary reasons. First, it is used because it is a measure of the 
health and strength of the economy and captures the economic opportunities within a nation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  To	  clarify	  the	  paper,	  regime	  change	  and/or	  partial	  collapse	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  regime	  collapse	  from	  this	  point	  
forward	  in	  the	  paper.	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Second, it was one of the most complete data sets in terms of a measure of economic health of a 
nation. While it would have been useful to measure the inequality in these countries, the data was 
very limited and did not provide a complete overview of the economic situation. The GDP per 
capita information used in this particular study is taken from The World Bank database, World 
Development Indicators.  
Unemployment, male (% of male labor force) (modeled ILO Estimate)  
Another important measure of the economic health of a nation is the level of unemployment. In 
this study, the unemployment data focuses on male unemployment, and while it is taken from the 
World Bank the data are based off of an estimate by the International Labor Organization. 
Unemployment levels are of particular interest, as the greater the number of unemployed, the 
weaker the economy and the fewer the opportunities. If individuals (particularly males) have 
fewer opportunities and they feel underserved by their government or the greater community, 
there is potentially a higher likelihood that they will join rebel or extremists groups (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004). However, while the level of unemployment could potentially provide insight 
into why internal instability occurs, the data are limited, and in this particular study, two separate 
regressions were run – one with unemployment as an independent variable and one without. This 
is due to the fact that there were numerous years and numerous countries that lacked 
unemployment data, which limited the number of observations. Nonetheless, it is possible that 
the level of male unemployment could shed some important light on the impact of the lack of 
opportunities and inequality on internal conflict.  
Population 
Another independent variable that has been found to be statistically significant and impact the 
predictive probability in pervious studies is the total population of a nation. As noted by O’Brien 
(2010) and Ward et al. (2010), the total population of a nation also impacts the predictive 
probability of internal conflict, while also being statistically significant as noted by Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004). These scholars argue that the larger the 
population, the harder it is for a government to control its population, and the more likely this 
population is able to organize and fight against the regime. It is also possible that the larger the 
population is, the less homogenous it is, and the more likely certain groups are to fight against 
one another – directly increasing the likelihood and severity of internal conflict. Therefore, this 
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study includes the commonly accepted conclusion that population does impact the likelihood of 
internal conflict, so the variable is included. The data comes from The World Bank World 
Development Indicators database. 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism 
The Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism independent variable is taken 
from The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators data set. This particular variable 
“measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated 
violence, including terrorism” (The World Bank, 2015). The Political Stability index is available 
for 215 countries during the period 1996-2014. It is measured on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 with a 
more positive score correlating to a greater degree of political stability and lower levels of 
predicted violence and terrorism. While the purpose of this model is to test the likelihood of 
internal instability based on particular independent variables, including a measure of political 
stability allows the model to capture the significance of prior levels of instability on the future 
likelihood of instability. This model is better able to then model whether or not prior levels of 
instability are significant or if conflict occurs on a year by year or case by case basis regardless 
of prior events. To some degree, including this variable in the model is a check on whether or not 
the original prediction is accurate.  
Rule of Law  
As noted, the Rule of Law (taken from The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
data set) is an estimate that “captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society”. Additionally, the Rule of Law estimate captures the quality 
of “contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts” as well as the predicted 
level of violence and crime (The World Bank, 2015). This variable is included in order to 
measure the level of trust in the government as well as the strength of the institutions tasked with 
protecting the physical and material well-being of citizens. The lower the level of rule of law, the 
greater the potential for a higher level of internal conflict and regime instability.  
Voice and Accountability  
The voice and accountability variable is also taken from The World Bank and is an estimate of 
the level of citizen participation in government and the level of freedom of expression, freedom 
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of association, and freedom of the media. This factor is important to any study analyzing the 
level of internal instability and regime stability, as a greater level of citizen participation and 
freedom of expression, the higher the level of peaceful dissent. The likelihood of violent 
resistance against a government is far less likely if the regime is not repressive, and people are 
able to express their displeasure publicly, peacefully, and with no fear of violent retribution. 
Because this is the case, a variable that measures the openness and extent of government 
accountability is important to this study.  
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 people) 
Another potentially significant variable is mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people. In prior 
scholarship, the impact of technology has not been modeled, as it was not prevalent before the 
early 2000s. However, this study provides a foundation for future work on the importance of 
technology on internal instability. These data are provided by the World Bank, and are an 
estimate of the number of cellular subscriptions per 100 people in the entire country. This 
variable is important for several reasons. First, the Arab Spring began as a grass roots movement 
where information was sent regarding protests and the movements of the regime via cell phones 
and social media. In less developed and less free nations access to cell phones is more 
widespread than access to the internet and the censorship of its use if far more challenging. 
Second, access to, and the use of technology have not been modeled or tested in prior work on 
internal instability. Therefore, mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people is used as a proxy 
variable to capture the potential impact of technology on the Arab Spring.  
Internet Users (per 100 people) 
In conjunction with Mobile Cellular Subscriptions, this study also includes the variable Internet 
Users (per 100 people). Many have speculated about the impact of social media, blog posts, and 
internet use in general on the Arab Spring. This study aims to quantify the speculation of many 
by including an independent variable that captures the use and prevalence of technology during 
the Arab Spring. By including internet users per 100 people as an independent variable, this 
study captures the potential impact of social media, blogging, and general internet use on the 
likelihood of internal instability. While this does not necessarily distinguish between the type of 
use, it does capture the accessibility and general use of the internet in each nation before, during, 
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and after the Arab Spring. This study provides a foundation for future work on the importance of 
technology on the Arab Spring and coming periods of internal instability.  
Variables Not Included 
Two variables that were found to be statistically significant and have an impact on the predictive 
probability of prior models – Male Secondary Education and Inequality – were not included in 
this model. This is largely due to the lack of complete data for the time period and countries used 
in this study. Furthermore, rather than looking at the education level of males, this study 
approaches the question of the importance of opportunities for males from a more economic 
perspective. This is evident in the fact that this study looks at the level of male unemployment 
rather than education. In terms of addressing inequality, this study uses GDP per Capita 
(purchasing power parity in USD) to capture economic opportunity, and the overall strength and 
health of a national economy.  
Empirical Methodology  
This study investigates the relationship between regime collapse and internal instability, and 
several independent variables. In particular, the impact of economic wellbeing indicators, and 
access to and the use of technology on the probability of regime collapse are studied. The study 
also analyzes the impact of the stability of the regime, the rule of law, and the level of freedom 
and accountability.  
 As previously mentioned, a logit regression is run, as it models a binary dependent 
variable, in this study, regime collapse. Using the statistical software program Stata, a regression 
is run for the probability of regime collapse (dependent variable) based on specific economic, 
political, social, and technological independent variables. Below is the general logit regression 
model: 
 
 Pr 𝑌 = 1 𝑋1,𝑋2,…𝑋! = 𝐹(𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋1+ 𝛽!𝑋2+ 𝛽!𝑋!)  Pr 𝑌 = 1 𝑋1,𝑋2,…𝑋! = 11+ 𝑒!(!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)  
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Pr 𝑌 = 1 𝑋1,𝑋2,…𝑋! = 11+ 1𝑒(!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)      
 
The general model above is then filled using the variables (dependent and independent) 
mentioned in the prior section. This results in the model outlined below: Pr  (𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒  𝑜𝑟  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)= 1 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 %𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ,𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ,𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤,    𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎, 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠   
 = 𝐹(𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 %𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽!  𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦+ 𝛽!𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝛽!𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽!𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎+ 𝛽!𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) 
General Description of Data 
The table below provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used to test the model. 
Variable  Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Time (Year) 152 2010.5 2.298862 2007 2014 
Country Name 152 10 5.495332 1 19 
Regime Change or Instability 152 0.2434211 0.4305658 0 1 
Unemployment (%male) 126 7.578571 4.175579 0.1 17.1 
Population Total 152 1.99E+07 2.36E+07 406724 8.96E+07 
Political Stability 152 -0.5293574 1.112623 -2.793988 1.271174 
Rule of Law 152 -0.1771547 0.8066086 -1.923882 1.596532 
Voice and Accountability 152 -0.9674259 0.6490644 -1.895699 1.237764 
GDP per Capita (PPP-USD) 141 16788.37 20895.76 1060.815 97518.61 
Internet Users (per 100) 151 36.6052 24.8092 0.93 91.49 
Mobile Phone Subscriptions (per 100) 152 102.5032 45.63158 8.706632 218.4303 
 
General Data Summary 
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 The table above provides a general overview of the data. Some data points – 
unemployment, population total, GDP per capita, Internet users and mobile phone subscriptions 
(per 100 people) are all self-explanatory. However, understanding the data points of Political 
Stability, Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability is vital to understanding the model. As 
previously noted, these three variables are the aggregation of numerous different variables from 
numerous studies. They range in value from -2.5 to 2.5. The higher the score (closer to 2.5) the 
more stable the country, the greater the rule of law, and the more responsive the government. As 
the table shows, the means for each of these variables is negative, indicating that the 19 countries 
as a whole are relatively unstable with limited rule of law and government accountability.  
Results and Findings  
Two separate models were run using Stata with the data entered as panel data and using the 
command to find a binary logit regression model of panel data.  
The First Model  Pr  (𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒  𝑜𝑟  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)= 1 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 %𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ,𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ,𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤,    𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎, 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠   
 = 𝐹(𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 %𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽!  𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦+ 𝛽!𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝛽!𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽!𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎+ 𝛽!𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) 
 
 
 
 
Model One Summary 
Number of Observations 119 
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Number of groups 18 
Obs per group:   
min 1 
avg 6.6 
max 7 
Integration points 12 
Wald chi2(8) 19.05 
Prob > chi2 0.0146 
Log likelihood  -46.1347 
 
Outcome 
regimechangeinstability	   Coef.	   Std.	  Err.	   z	   P>z	   [95%	  Conf.	  Interval]	  
	         mobilecellularsubscriptionsper10	   0.0401979	   0.012563	   3.2	   0.001	   0.015576	   0.06482	  
unemploymentmaleofmalelaborforce	   0.0054299	   0.121453	   0.04	   0.964	   -­‐0.23261	   0.243473	  
populationtotalsppoptotl	   4.41E-­‐09	   1.42E-­‐08	   0.31	   0.756	   -­‐2.35E-­‐08	   3.23E-­‐08	  
politicalstabilityandabsenceofvi	   -­‐2.230723	   0.818593	   -­‐2.73	   0.006	   -­‐3.83514	   -­‐0.62631	  
ruleoflawestimaterlest	   0.3889231	   1.070159	   0.36	   0.716	   -­‐1.70855	   2.486396	  
voiceandaccountabilityestimateva	   1.671666	   0.68606	   2.44	   0.015	   0.327014	   3.016318	  
gdppercapitacurrentusnygdppcapcd	   3.91E-­‐06	   3.87E-­‐05	   0.1	   0.92	   -­‐7.2E-­‐05	   7.97E-­‐05	  
internetusersper100peopleitnetus	   -­‐0.0261388	   0.023875	   -­‐1.09	   0.274	   -­‐0.07293	   0.020655	  
_cons	   -­‐4.911351	   1.852248	   -­‐2.65	   0.008	   -­‐8.54169	   -­‐1.28101	  
	         /lnsig2u	   -­‐14.10668	   43.83878	  
	    
-­‐100.029	   71.81575	  
	         sigma_u	   0.0008645	   0.01895	  
	    
1.90E-­‐22	   3.93E+15	  
rho	   2.27E-­‐07	   9.96E-­‐06	  
	    
1.10E-­‐44	   1	  
 
Findings of Model One 
The first model – which included all independent variables – had 119 observations (as the 
lack of unemployment data points decreased the number of observations – see Model 2). The log 
likelihood was -23.28. There were three independent variables that were statistically significant 
at the 10% level: (1) Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (z-score: of 3.2, p-value: 0.001, coef.: 0.04), 
(2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism (z-score: -2.73, p-value: 0.006, 
coef.: -2.23), and (3) Voice and Accountability (z-score: 2.44, p-value: 0.015, coef.: 1.67). There 
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are no other statistically significant variables even if the level is increased to 20%. Internet Users 
(per 100 people) – a variable of focus in this paper – does not meet the threshold of statistical 
significance with a z-score of -1.09 and a p-value of 0.274. In addition to a lack of statistical 
significance, the coefficient is also very small (-0.026) which demonstrates its lack of impact on 
the predictive probability.  
It is important to note that the Unemployment Level (% males), Population (total), and 
GDP per capita (PPP-USD) are all statistically insignificant. Unemployment level (% males) has 
a z-score of 0.04 and a p-value of 0.964. This is also the case with the Population (total), as the 
z-score is 0.31 and the p-value is 0.756. GDP per capita has a z-score of 0.1 and a p-value of 
0.92. Furthermore, the coefficients on all of these variables are less than 0.001, indicating very 
limited impact on the predictive probability (not to mention the lack of statistical significance).  
The variables that exhibited statistical significance at the 5% level – (1) Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions, (2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism, and (3) Voice and 
Accountability – all provide interesting insights into the reasons internal instability occurs. Based 
on this model and the findings, both technology and Voice and Accountability have a positive 
correlation with the probability of internal instability. In terms of mobile phone subscriptions, 
this positive correlation indicates that the greater the information flowing between dissenters and 
the more easily accessible that information, the more likely there will be internal instability. 
However, it is interesting that a higher degree of freedom of speech and accountability would be 
positively correlated to regime change and internal instability. It is interesting that the data shows 
that a government that is more responsive to the demands of the people would be less stable and 
that greater accountability and freedom of speech would increase the likelihood of internal 
instability or regime change. However, perhaps this is due to the fact that a government that is 
more willing to allow dissenting opinions is also more likely to face internal instability in the 
form of protests and mass movements. However despite this possible explanation, the positive 
correlation between “voice and accountability” and increasing levels of regime change and 
internal instability found in this study warrant further study.  
This model is also interesting, as the factors found by prior scholars to be statistically 
significant and impact the predictive probability of the model – percent male Unemployment, 
Population, and GDP per capita – were not statistically significant and had small coefficients 
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indicating limited impact on the predictive probability. It is interesting that this particular model 
did not concur with the vast majority of research and modeling in this area. However, much of 
the prior research and modeling focuses on regions and time periods that do not include the Arab 
Spring of 2010-2011, and perhaps do not capture the unique nature of the Arab Spring uprisings, 
instability, and regime change. It is interesting that this study did not find the economic variables 
(Unemployment and GDP per capita) to be statistically significant or impact the predictive 
probability of the model. This lack of impact can perhaps be attributed to the unique nature of the 
Arab Spring uprisings and the political focus of these uprisings. It is interesting that this model 
found that political factors such as the Voice and Accountability of the government and levels of 
prior internal instability as well as technology – Mobile Phone Subscriptions – were the most 
statistically significant and had the greatest impact on the predictive probability of the model. 
However this also calls into question whether this model could be applied to other datasets that 
capture different time periods, regions, and nations. Because of this discrepancy, further research 
on the Arab Spring, the significance of political vs. economic factors, and the role of technology 
warrant further research. 
 
The Second Model 
The second model does not include the Unemployment independent variable. This is because 
there is a lack of data points for Unemployment that limits the number of observations to 119. 
When the Unemployment independent variable is excluded, the number of observations increases 
to 140.  
 Pr  (𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒  𝑜𝑟  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) = 1 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ,𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤,    𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎, 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠   = 𝐹(𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽!  𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽!𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤+ 𝛽!𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽!𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽!𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠+ 𝛽!𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) 
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Model Two Summary 
Number of obs 140 
Number of groups 19 
Obs per group:  
 min 1 
avg 7.4 
max 8 
Integration points 12 
Wald chi2(7) 21.79 
Prob > chi2 0.0028 
 
Outcome 
regimechangeinstability Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       mobilecellularsubscriptionsper10 0.02982 0.009378 3.18 0.001 0.0114385 0.048201 
populationtotalsppoptotl 1.62E-09 1.13E-08 0.14 0.886 -2.04E-08 2.37E-08 
politicalstabilityandabsenceofvi -1.4733 0.581081 -2.54 0.011 -2.612195 -0.3344 
ruleoflawestimaterlest -0.10423 0.794103 -0.13 0.896 -1.660643 1.452181 
voiceandaccountabilityestimateva 1.255797 0.573653 2.19 0.029 0.1314582 2.380136 
gdppercapitacurrentusnygdppcapcd 9.21E-07 2.91E-05 0.03 0.975 -0.0000561 5.79E-05 
internetusersper100peopleitnetus -0.02607 0.018743 -1.39 0.164 -0.062802 0.01067 
_cons -3.50988 1.042325 -3.37 0.001 -5.552795 -1.466958 
       /lnsig2u -14.5468 646.7459 
  
-1282.146 1253.052 
       sigma_u 0.000694 0.224343 
  
3.90E-279 1.20E+272 
rho 1.46E-07 9.46E-05 
  
0 . 
 
 
 
Findings of Model Two 
 The second model – which had 140 observations – did not include the unemployment 
variable as previously stated. As the table above demonstrates, there are three variables that are 
statistically significant at the five percent level. These variables are (1) Mobile Cellular 
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Subscriptions (z-score: 3.18, p-value: 0.001, coef.: 0.029), (2) Political Stability (z-score: -2.54, 
p-value: 0.011, coef.: -1.47), and (3) Voice and Accountability (z-score: 2.19, p-value: 0.029, 
coef.: 1.26). If the statistical significance level is increased to 20%, then Internet Users (per 100 
people) is statistically significant (z-score: -1.39, p-value: 0.164, coef.: -0.026).Once again, this 
model does not find Population or GDP per capita to be statistically significant or have a large 
impact on the predictive probability of the model (refer to table above for z-scores, p-values, and 
coefficients). This confirms the findings of Model 1 which included the Unemployment variable 
and also found Population and GDP per capita to be statistically insignificant.  
 Dropping the Unemployment variable increases the number of observations which does 
have an impact on the statistical significance and predictive probability of the other independent 
variables. This is particular true in the case of Internet Users, which is statistically significant in 
the second model but not the first. However, its coefficient has a negative value which indicates 
that the greater the number of internet users, the less likely there will be internal instability. One 
possible explanation for this is the fact that nations that have greater access to the internet are 
also likely better off. This in turn means that people are materially satisfied and would 
potentially be less likely to participate in an uprising. Another possible explanation for this 
counter-intuitive finding is that the variable Internet Users (per 100 people) does not capture 
how those internet users use or used the internet. The level of government censorship and control 
over internet access is not measured, which limits the ability of this study to differentiate internet 
use for mundane tasks (shopping, talking to friends, etc.) and internet use that would fuel internal 
instability (dissenting blog posts, posting photos/videos of government violence, coordinating 
protests and gatherings, etc.). For this reason, it is necessary for further research to better 
differentiate between mundane and incendiary internet use.  
 The second model also confirms the importance of political factors and the lack of 
importance of economic factors (at least those used in this study), in this model and the Arab 
Spring more generally. As the statistical significance and impact on predictive probability 
indicates, political factors – Voice and Accountability and Prior Internal Instability – had a 
greater impact than economic factors – Unemployment (% males) and GDP per capita – on the 
likelihood of internal instability during the Arab Spring and the surrounding time period (2007-
2014). Furthermore, we can see that technology did play during the Arab Spring. While Mobile 
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Cellular Subscriptions had a positive correlation with internal instability, its impact was limited 
as indicated by the small coefficient in both models. Interestingly, Internet Users (while only 
statistically significant in the second model) had a negative correlation to internal instability. 
This is odd, as it indicates that the greater the number of internet users, the less likely the 
probability of internal instability. Nonetheless, these findings indicate that increasing levels of 
technology could have a direct impact on the likelihood of conflict. As the spread and use of 
technology continues to grow, the importance of its use will only increase. This model 
demonstrates that technology does play a role in internal conflict and despite limited impact on 
predictive probability, it is a subject worth exploring further.  
Predictive Accuracy of Model Two 
 Finally, in this section, Model Two is tested for its predictive accuracy. In order to do 
this, a threshold of when a conflict might occur must be determined. This paper follows the logic 
of Ward et al., who establish that a binary dependent variable with a value greater than or equal 
to 0.5 predicts internal conflict and a value less than 0.5 indicates no internal conflict (2010, p. 
366). In order to check the predictive probability of the model, 140 observations were analyzed 
using the logit regression equation that calculates whether or not the dependent variable (Y) is 
equal to one (Y=1) for any value of X (Referred to as 𝑝 in the equation below). Model Two has 
12 incomplete data points, as the GDP per capita variable was unavailable for 11 countries 
during specific years while the Internet Users data was unavailable for a single year. Therefore, 
the predictive probability of the model was tested using 140 observations rather than the full 152. 
The logit regression equation is detailed below: 
General Formula 
𝑝 = !"#  (!!!⋯!!!!!)!!!"#  (!!!⋯!!!!!) = !(!!!⋯!!!!!)!!!(!!!⋯!!!!!)  
 
Specified Formula 
𝑝 = exp 𝐵! +⋯+ 𝐵!𝑋!1+ exp 𝐵! +⋯+ 𝐵!𝑋!   
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= !(!!.!"!!.!"#$!!!!.!"!!!"!!!!.!"#!!!!.!"#!!!!.!"#!!!!.!"!!!"!!!!.!"#$!!)!!!(!!.!"!!.!"#$!!!!.!"!!!"!!!!.!"#!!!!.!"#!!!!.!"#!!!!.!"!!!"!!!!.!"#$!!)  
 
 
Variable 𝑿𝒌 Value Coefficient Value 
Mobile Cell Subscriptions 𝑋! 0.02982 
Population 𝑋! 1.62E-09 
Political Stability 𝑋! -1.4733 
Rule of Law 𝑋! -0.10423 
Voice and Accountability 𝑋! 1.255797 
GDP per capita 𝑋! 9.21E-07 
Internet Users 𝑋! -0.02607 𝐵! Value NA -3.50988 
 
 The accuracy of this model was tested using the formula above. Using the 0.5 threshold, 
the model correctly predicted nine periods of internal conflict. It did not predict 22 other cases of 
internal instability and had four false positives, where it predicted conflict but no conflict 
actually occurred. Furthermore, it did not predict conflict in 108 cases in which there was not 
conflict. If the predictive level is dropped to 0.45, the model becomes more effective at 
predicting conflict. The model correctly predicts 15 periods of internal conflict but the false 
positives increase to five. However, the number of conflicts that the model does not predict 
properly falls from 22 to 16. Using the 0.45 threshold, the model correctly predicts internal 
conflict one out of every two times (48.4%) compared to only 29 percent of the time with a 0.5 
threshold. This indicates a relatively strong model compared to prior work. Fearon and Laitin’s 
model correctly predicted 0 out of 107 periods of internal conflict at the 0.5 threshold while the 
model of Collier and Hoeffler predicted 3 out of 46 (7%) periods of internal conflict correctly 
with 5 false positives (Ward et al, 2010, p. 366). The model presented in this paper correctly 
predicts nine out of 31 periods of conflict correctly with four false positives at the 0.5 threshold 
and 15 out of 31 correctly with five false positives at the 0.45 threshold. This indicates that the 
model at both the 0.5 and 0.45 thresholds is better able to accurately predict conflict than some 
prior work. While this model does perform better than some prior research, there are limitations.  
Limitations and Future Research 
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Several important limitations of this paper should be noted. One limitation of this paper is 
that it only uses one type of model (logit) to predict internal instability. Many of the more 
advanced systems, like the ICEWS of the US Department of Defense, combine numerous models 
and have thousands of data points and hundreds of case studies. The model used in this paper 
has, at most, 140 observations (Model Two, the more complete model, is missing 12 data points). 
This limits the accuracy of the model and the ability of the model to be used outside of the 
original data set. Another limitation of this data is that it focuses exclusively on the Middle East 
during one period of internal instability. With such limited data, it is hard to know how accurate 
this model is and how impactful technology truly is on internal instability. While this paper 
purposefully focuses on the impact of technology on internal conflict during the Arab Spring, 
this also severally limits the amount of data and case studies that are used. For this reason, the 
importance of technology must be further researched in the future using other case studies 
beyond the Arab Spring the Middle East more generally. Again, at this time, additional data sets 
or case studies are not readily available, as there have been only a limited number of serious 
cases of internal instability during the 21st century when technology truly became significant and 
widespread. As time goes on, and more periods of internal instability occur, future research will 
be better able to test whether or not technology plays a significant role in fostering internal 
instability.  
Implications and Conclusion  
 Regime collapse and internal instability dramatically impact the ability of nations to 
protect their citizens and maintain stability. Furthermore, the repercussions of these conflicts and 
regime changes impact the international community and global economic markets. Recently, as 
technology has become more prevalent and easily accessed, governments, NGOs, and academics 
have all attempted to better understand the role of technology in fueling internal instability. This 
has largely taken the form of qualitative analysis of regional or country-specific experts who 
analyze the use of technology and the impact on internal instability. This was particularly true 
during the Arab Spring, when the use of social media, texting, and other forms of technology 
impacted the depth and breadth of uprisings throughout the Middle East. This study aimed to 
quantitatively measure the impact of technology on internal instability using proxy variables of 
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 people) and Internet Users (per 100 people) to measure 
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the impact of technology on internal instability during the Arab Spring and surrounding time 
period (2007-2014). It is clear from the findings that technology did play a role. However, while 
both variables were statistically significant, neither had a major impact on the predictive 
probability (as indicated by their coefficients) and the impact of Internet Users was actually 
negatively correlated to internal instability which warrants further research.  
The model did shed important light on the work of other scholars who found that (1) 
Unemployment, (2) GDP per capita, and (3) Population – were statistically significant and 
impacted the predictive probability of the model. However, this study did not find these three 
variables to be statistically significant nor did they have a major impact on the predictive 
probability of the model. These findings suggest that the economic indicators were not as 
important as political factors in instigating or preventing internal instability. Both Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism and Voice and Accountability were statistically 
significant and impacted the predictive probability of the model. This indicates that political 
factors were more significant to internal instability during the Arab Spring than were economic 
indicators. The unique nature of regimes in the region could play a role. The vast major were, 
and continue to be, authoritarian regimes or monarchies. These regimes limit political rights and 
personal freedoms. Economically, many nations in the Gulf are incredibly wealthy because of 
natural resource exploitation. However, the depth and duration of political oppression is perhaps 
more to blame for the uprisings during the Arab Spring than the desire for greater economic 
opportunities. However, the fact that better Voice and Accountability of a government had a 
negative correlation with regime stability indicates that further research must be done in order to 
better understand the impact of government responsiveness and freedom of expression on 
internal instability.  
 At both the 0.5 and 0.45 thresholds, the model was more effective at accurately 
predicting internal conflict than previous models have proven to be. At the 0.45 threshold, the 
model correctly predicted almost half of all periods of internal conflict. While this is not as 
accurate as governments, NGOs, and academia would like, it does provide a foundation for 
further research when there are greater data on periods of internal instability during this time of 
increasing access to and use of technology.  
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 While this model is a preliminary study of the impact of technology on internal 
instability, it nonetheless sheds light on the changing nature of internal instability and the 
importance of changing models to fit the times. We have entered a period of incredible 
technological advancement, proliferation, and access. Nations are highly interconnected and 
news and information travels around the world in seconds. Future models must address the 
importance of technology on internal instability if they wish to remain relevant and provide new 
insights into this vital area of study.  
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